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The common law seems to suffer from a countermajoritarian difficulty: in most of the world, 
it is law made by unelected judges. What could justify it? In this essay I consider the answer 
to this question through the lens of the question of convergence among common law 
countries. Common law convergence is the view that different common law jurisdictions 
should aim to have a (fairly) similar laws of contract, torts, and so on. I identify three 
different attitudes towards common law convergence. One view seeks universal 
convergence (one that extends to all legal systems, regardless of their origin), the second 
limits convergence to common law jurisdictions (explicitly rejecting convergence with non-
common law jurisdictions), and the third is uninterested, even hostile, to common law 
convergence. I consider the philosophical assumptions behind each of these three 
approaches and explain how they address the common law’s seeming lack of democratic 
legitimacy. I then go on to show that these different views on the legitimacy of the common 
law are have implications on matters that appear unrelated to it, such as the scope of tort 
liability of public authorities. I conclude the essay with a simple model seeking to explain 
why, in spite of the historical popularity of the idea of common law convergence (especially 
within the Commonwealth), common law jurisdictions have been drifting apart. 
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Prologue 
Following the economic crisis of the last few years, John Maynard Keynes has once again as-
sumed centre-stage.1 In this essay I am not going to speak about Keynes’s economic ideas, but 
will attempt to say something about the significance he accorded to ideas. In the concluding 
paragraphs of his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money Keynes famously wrote 
that ‘the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled 
by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist….I am sure that the power of 
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas’.2 
Keynes alludes in these brief remarks to a longstanding debate among historians and philoso-
phers of history on the relative significance of ideas and interests.3 In this essay I will explore 
the influence of ideas on the common law. I will attempt to show that different answers to a 
philosophical question on the authority of the common law have very practical implications 
to the question of the relevance of convergence and divergence between different legal sys-
tems. Even more contentiously, I will argue that these philosophical debates have implications 
to substantive questions of tort law. In both domains, we cannot make complete sense of the 
debate and have no basis for choosing one answer over another without attending to underly-
ing ideologies. Even lawyers who believe themselves to be engaged in ‘practical’ scholarship, 
seeking to account for the law as found in the case and base whatever normative suggestions 
they make on nothing more than the idea that like cases be treated alike,4 should not ignore 
the significance of these ideas.  
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 For a comprehensive survey see ‘2008–09 Keynesian Resurgence’ in Wikipedia, available at http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008%E2%80%9309_Keynesian_resurgence (visited 2 Dec. 2014). 
2 John Maynard Keynes, A General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936) 
383. 
3 See e.g. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 101–08. 
4 See e.g., Andrew Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution 
(Oxford: Hart, 1998) 108, 118–19, 127; Andrew Burrows, ‘The Influence of Comparative Law on the English Law of 
Obligations’ (this volume) MS at 1, 29. On the question-begging nature of treating like cases alike see Dan Priel, 
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I. The Puzzle of the Authority of the Common Law 
For all the talk about the decline of the state, the rise of supranational legal regimes, and the 
growing significance of foreign, transnational, and international law, much law is still tethered 
to nation states. And many who have thought about the matter have argued that within lim-
its, states have legitimate authority to make laws that apply to the people who live within their 
boundaries. These days such accounts typically connect the authority to make laws to democ-
racy. How exactly this link is to be drawn is, of course, a contested question, but no matter 
how one wishes to fill in the details, they do not seem to fit the common law particularly well. 
First, the principal lawmakers in the common law are judges, who are typically unelected and 
unrepresentative. If the authority of law depends on its democratic credentials, then the 
common law seems to flout this requirement. Second and related, the common law seems to 
transcend state or other political boundaries, while tying together legal systems that some-
times have no political links to each other, and are geographically (and perhaps in other ways) 
far apart.  
This puzzle can be presented in the following, very rough, syllogism: 
(1) The (legitimate) authority of law derives from the authority of the state. 
(2) The (legitimate) authority of the state derives from having democratic institutions. 
(3) The common law is undemocratic. 
Hence, (4) the authority of the common law looks suspect.  
As presented, this syllogism is not meant to be an air-tight deductive argument, as its premises 
are very vaguely phrased. Nonetheless, it is helpful for presenting the problem of what I will 
call the puzzle of the authority of the common law, as well as for outlining possible answers to 
it. I will distinguish between three positions that can be placed on a spectrum that has com-
plete legal localism at one end and legal universalism at the other. The first approach I will 
consider answers the puzzle by rejecting premise (3). Thus, this approach solves the puzzle of 
the common law’s authority by explaining it away. It seeks to subsume the authority of the 
common law within a broader account of democratic authority. The second approach rejects 
premise (1). This view asserts, in effect, that the error in this argument is the thought that the 
authority of law derives from the state. On this view, the authority of law derives from its con-
tent, from the correspondence of laws to an external standard—say, morality or natural law. 
So understood, even if the authority of the state is derived from maintaining democratic insti-
tutions, the authority of law (or at least the authority of the common law) is independent of 
those institutions. In fact, even the authority of democratic institutions on this view is derived 
from deeper moral principles. The third approach focuses on premise (2). At its strongest, this 
view seeks the authority of the state in the idea of a political tradition, which it sees as more 
Review of Lloyd Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, (2008) 57 Journal of Legal Education 
579, 580–82; Charlie Webb, ‘Treating Like Cases Alike: Principle and Classification in Private Law’ in Andrew 
Robertson & Tang Hang Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 215, 227–28. 
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foundational than democracy. Though this view can be stated generally, in its legal incarna-
tion, its proponents do not deny that the authority of some law is derived from the authority 
of the state, but they reject the idea that this is true of the authority of all law. Specifically, 
proponents of this typically view draw a sharp distinction between statute law, for which they 
think something like the syllogism is true, and common law, whose authority, they argue, is 
grounded in tradition. 
What do these debates in political philosophy have to do with the concern of ‘practical 
lawyers’ about divergences in the common law? As I will try to demonstrate, quite a lot. The 
first view lends itself to the idea that convergence among common law countries is, if it hap-
pens, an interesting empirical finding, but it rejects outright the view that sees convergence as 
a normative ideal. The second view also rejects the ideal of common law convergence; but it 
does so in a very different way. The second view implies an ideal of universal convergence, one 
in which divergences among common law jurisdictions are no more problematic than diver-
gence between common law and non-common law jurisdictions. It is only the third approach 
that fits the view (quite popular in certain circles) that common law jurisdictions, and only 
common law jurisdictions, ought to aim for convergence. To many who study the laws of 
contract, tort, property, trusts and so on—those areas of law sometimes simply called ‘the 
common law’—talk of English, Canadian, or Australian common law is in some sense mis-
leading. Ultimately, they will say, there really is just one common law. More than a descrip-
tion of reality, this is thought to be a normative claim: Divergences between (say) English and 
Australian law are a cause for concern, while divergences between (say) English and French 
law are not. 5 
In what follows I attempt to further explain the theoretical presuppositions of these 
competing approaches. I will first try to substantiate my claim that the different attitudes to 
the question of authority relate to different conceptions of authority. I will then argue that 
these differences also manifest themselves in different answers to substantive questions within 
private law. I will demonstrate this claim by looking at a few of the last decisions of the House 
of Lords and argue that we can make better sense of some divergences among the law lords if 
we understand them to hold different views on the authority of (common) law. Finally, I will 
argue that even assuming the view of authority that is most sympathetic to common law con-
vergence, there are practical constraints that make such a convergence difficult to maintain. 
This explains why we see growing divergences among common law jurisdictions, a trend that I 
predict will continue.  
5 For example, contrast Robert Stevens’s claim that divergences within the common law are ‘disturbing’, 
which he makes in ‘Torts’ in Louis Blom-Cooper et al (eds), The Judicial House of Lords: 1876–2009 (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2009) 629, 630, with his affirmation of divergences between common law and civil law juris-
dictions in Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 341, 347. 
4 
II. Three Views on the Authority of (Common) Law
In this section I will present three views about the authority of the common law. I will first 
present these views as ideal-types. As will become clearer towards the end of this section, reali-
ty is typically more complex; nevertheless, I believe the ideal-types approach helps to bring to 
light the issues that are at stake.6  
A. Legal Localism 
No-one finds it odd that Britain’s constitutional law is different from Germany’s or that 
France’s copyright laws are different from those of the United States. No-one finds it odd that 
these differences are not confined to details, that they reflect a different ‘philosophy’ about 
separation of powers or democracy, about what these areas of law seek to achieve, or what val-
ues a legal system should strive to protect or promote through them. Why should tort or con-
tract law be any different? Presenting the question in this way helps articulate a view. On this 
view, whether law deals with the regulation of air travel, the definition of and punishment for 
theft, the formation of contracts, or the legal response to cartels, it is the product of state au-
thorities. True, some of the laws are created by the legislature, other laws by other public bod-
ies (administrative tribunals, government bureaucrats, courts), but this fact does not show 
that the source of authority of laws of the second kind is any different from that of laws of the 
first kind. The fact that judges make law is thus in itself not more problematic than the fact 
that civil servants make law. (Even legislation, officially enacted by a democratically-elected 
legislature, is rarely exclusively, or even primarily, the work of the people’s democratically-
elected representatives; but that is a different matter.) In short, this view subsumes the com-
mon law under the general lawmaking power of the state. The way of solving the puzzle of the 
authority of the common law is not to present the common law as unique—the common law 
on this view is law just like any other—but rather by explaining how the way it is promulgat-
ed can be made to fit our ideas of democratic authority. In the modern state where much law 
is not created by elected representatives, that does not look like an insurmountable challenge.  
If the mere fact that judges make law in those areas we call ‘common law’ is not a chal-
lenge to democratic authority (any more than any other delegated lawmaking is), it does, 
however, affect the specific contours of its institutions. For in a place in which this is the dom-
inant conception of the authority of the common law we can expect to see its institutions 
shaped and understood in a way that fits these democratic credentials. Within the common 
law world, the country whose legal institutions reflect this view more purely than any other is 
the United States. And indeed, there are certain unique features to American common law 
that make sense only if one assumes the view that the authority of law derives from its being 
made by state institutions. I will mention three: Much more than in other common law coun-
6 The ideas in this section are developed in greater detail in Dan Priel, ‘Conceptions of Authority, Common 
Law Divergences, and the Future of a Common Law World’ (unpublished). Unlike the three-fold typology found 





tries the ‘common law’ of the United States—the law of contract, tort, and property of the 
different states—is nowadays codified. If the common law is not unique, if this area of law is 
not somehow a unique domain of the judiciary, then like all other law it should be found in 
statute. A second feature in which American common law now differs from most of the rest of 
the common law world is its continued commitment to a jury trial in both criminal and civil 
matters. Part of the justification offered for maintaining the jury trial is that it is a popular 
lawmaking institution, a means for ‘the people’ to have a say in, or control over, what the law 
is.7 Finally, there is the method of appointing judges. What strikes outsiders as one of the 
oddest features of American law is the prevalence of elected judiciary in state courts. Even 
with federal judges, who are not elected, their nomination process is openly political in a 
manner that has no parallel in other common law countries. This practice looks much less 
odd against the view that the lawmaking activity of judges must satisfy democratic con-
straints. All this fits a view much more dominant in American politics than elsewhere, which 
is that the executive and the judiciary (and not just the legislature) are representative of the 
people.8 
The answer to the puzzle of the authority of the common law, then, is that there is no 
puzzle. Judge-made common law is not undemocratic if, first, it is conceived of as a form of 
democratic lawmaking power; and, second, when there are various institutional mechanisms 
in place as well as an underlying democratic ethos for the common law, that turn this idea 
into a reality. When this approach is applied to the question of common law convergence, it 
implies a relatively unsympathetic view to convergence. Different legal systems will, of course, 
sometimes converge, but this is, more or less, a happenstance. It is not at all something to aim 
for. While not universally accepted, this view is very popular in the United States.  
B. Legal Universalism 
At the other end of the spectrum we find the universalist view according to which underlying 
the law there are some general principles applicable to all the world. This position has a long 
and distinguished history under various names, but it is probably best known as ‘natural law’. 
Stated abstractly, the idea that law should match some pre-existing, universal, standards is 
very familiar. It is held not just by self-styled natural lawyers, but also by their supposed intel-
lectual opposites, legal positivists.9 It is also held across the political spectrum, although those 
on the right tend to call those principles ‘natural rights’ whereas those on the left usually pre-
fer to speak of ‘human rights’.  
 
7 See Jenny E Carroll, ‘Nullification as Law’ (2014) 102 Georgetown Law Journal 579. 
8 See Robert J Pushaw, ‘Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach’ (1996) 81 Cornell 
Law Review 393, 420–25. 
9 Even the more specific claim, that law is authoritative to the extent that it matches morality is a nowadays 
a familiar positivist idea. This is achieved by the fact that most legal positivists these days think of it as a thesis 
about legal validity rather than a thesis about authority. For more on this see Dan Priel, ‘Toward Classical Legal 
Positivism’ (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review (forthcoming).   
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Here, however, I prefer to talk about a more specific idea, the view that law has authority 
because, and to the extent that, it matches pre-existing universal morality. Understood as a 
view about authority, legal universalism is not embarrassed by the obvious reality of diver-
gence between the laws of different countries. A proponent of this view need to accept two 
propositions: First, that there are universal moral principles that underlie the law; and second, 
that the authority of positive law derives from its correspondence with natural law.  
This view thus attempts to answer the puzzle of the authority of the common law by 
denying that the authority of law derives from its democratic credentials. If this is so, then the 
fact that the common law is undemocratic is not, by itself, a reason to question its authority 
any more than the authority of any other law. Thus, in pure form, this view rejects the 
uniqueness of the common law, but it does that in the opposite way to legal localism: No law 
is authoritative because of its democratic credentials. Both common (judge-made) law and 
statutes ultimately derive their authority from their correspondence to pre-existing moral 
norms. This view also rejects the uniqueness of the common law in another sense. It denies 
that there is anything special to common law jurisdictions, and therefore it denies that legal 
convergence should be limited just to these jurisdictions. If the underlying authority of all law 
is its correspondence with universal morality, it follows that the ideal of convergence of law 
extends to the whole world.10  
Thus, in one sense, this view endorses a very strong version of convergence. In another 
sense, however, this view sees no value in convergence per se. There is on this view little or no 
value in convergence if different legal systems converge on the wrong rules or principles. Even 
when legal systems converge on the right principles, the fact of convergence does not add to 
the goodness of the situation. Of course, it is better if more jurisdictions identify the right 
answers to what the content of their laws should be, but the fact of convergence itself adds 
nothing to the merit of this situation. 
A seemingly intractable challenge to this view is the fact that in the modern state much 
lawmaking is done by democratic institutions and does not pay particular heed to universal 
morality and is premised on the unique needs of a particular time and place. Even if one ac-
cepts that the common law reflects some universal values, the fairly insignificant amount of 
lawmaking done by judges these days, when compared to the vast amount of lawmaking in 
the modern regulatory state, would seem to render this position completely untenable as an 
argument for the authority of all law.  
A proponent of legal universalism may respond in three ways. The most radical response 
asserts that only universal laws—laws that avoid the promotion of particular policies—do not 
violate the rule of law, and only these laws can ultimately be justified. This was, for example, 
10 For an example of this view see Allan Beever, ‘How to Have a Common Private Law: The Presuppositions 
of Legal Conversation’ (this volume). Though at one point he says that ‘divergence [between common law jurisdic-
tions] is always problematic’ (MS at 10), he is clear that the ideal of convergence he aims for is not limited to the 





Hayek’s answer in The Road to Serfdom. In the chapter on the rule of law Hayek argued that 
only general rules that similarly apply to all (all over the world) are consistent with the rule of 
law.11 Closer to contemporary debates, this is also the answer offered by Allan Beever. Though 
he constructs his view somewhat differently, Beever believes that ‘there is an objective truth at 
which the law of the various jurisdictions aims’. He therefore rejects the idea that divergence 
between jurisdictions is to be explained by different ‘respons[es] to local conditions that differ 
between jurisdictions’; rather, he thinks that what explains those divergences is that different 
courts are ‘trying to do the same thing where reasonable people can reasonably disagree as to 
what ought to be done’.12 As presented, this argument is a fallacious. It is clearly not true that 
as a general matter laws cannot differ on the basis of local conditions: if one thinks that laws 
can be used to promote overall welfare, it is plain that local conditions will matter a great deal 
for determining the appropriate content for laws. Beever’s argument can only go through with 
the addition of a missing premise, namely that local conditions are irrelevant in lawmaking, 
and this view, in turn, can only be sustained if he assumes (like Hayek) that laws ought not be 
used to promote welfare.13 
Others, of less libertarian leanings, have adopted more accommodating strategies. One 
such approach recognizes the legitimacy of democratic lawmaking but considers it second-
ary—logically and normatively—to the universal principles enshrined in the common law. 
Consequently, democratically-adopted laws that conflict with the fundamental principles of 
the common law lack legitimate authority and may be declared legally invalid by a court, re-
gardless of an enabling constitutional provision.14 As this accommodating approach is more 
commonly adopted by Commonwealth public law scholars, I will set it aside here.  
 
11 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 2001 [1944]) ch 6. Hayek contrasts there a ‘perma-
nent framework of laws’, which consists of ‘rules applying to general types of situations’ with ‘the direction of eco-
nomic activity by a central authority’. Ibid., 76, 79. (In later writings he may have been closer to the universal 
common law approach I will discuss below.)  
12 Beever (n 10) MS at 22, 24.  
13 Elsewhere Beever claims that policy should have no place in any law (and not just in ‘private law’). See Al-
lan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 71. It is this view, as well as views he expresses 
elsewhere that warrant treating his position as more radical than Weinrib’s and places him very close to Hayek. See 
Dan Priel, ‘Private Law: Commutative or Distributive?’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 308, 328–29. However, in 
some places Beever accepts something like the distinctions found in Table 1. See Beever, Rediscovering, ibid., 13–14, 
52–53. In these places Beever accepts the weaker thesis that only the common law should not be used to promote 
welfare. 
14 See e.g., John Laws, The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 3 
(‘The common law is the interpreter of our statutes, and is the crucible which gives them life….[S]tatute law and 
government policy alike are delivered to the people through the prism of [common law] principles [such as reason, 
fairness, and the presumption of liberty]. This is the gift of the common law, the unifying principle of our consti-
tution. It is the means by which legislature and government are allowed efficacy but forbidden oppression.’); see 





The last response to the challenge from democracy is more often found in the work of 
Commonwealth private law scholars. Rather than prioritizing between the common law and 
statute, it sees the two as distinct and largely independent domains. This approach seeks fur-
ther support for the normative significance of the distinction between common law and stat-
ute by tying it to a series of additional, partially overlapping, distinctions:  
Common law Statute
Courts Legislatures
Private Law Public law
Morality (and moral philosophy) Politics (and political philosophy) 
Principle Policy
Corrective justice Distributive justice
Individual rights General welfare
Expertise (about morals) Democracy
Table 1: The common law–statute divide 
The authority of the common law on this view is still derived from its correspondence to 
moral truth; by contrast, the authority of statute derives from different societies’ adoption of 
different policies on the basis of their political preferences, as revealed by democratic process-
es. This view thus abandons common law universalism with regard to subject-matter, but 
maintains it with regard to geographic scope. The ideal convergence of private law on this 
view is not limited to common law jurisdictions: Reflecting universal morality, the content of 
private law should ideally be more or less the same throughout the world; public law, however, 
is for each political community to develop in accordance to its own values.   
It is well beyond the scope of this essay to carefully examine the merits of this view, but I 
will make three brief critical remarks about it. Beginning with an empirical observation, a 
fundamental problem with this approach is that it simply does not correspond to reality. The 
areas of law that are typically classified as ‘private law’ (contract, tort, and property) are shot 
through with statutes, which are often clearly motivated by distributive concerns. The divide 
also breaks down on the other side, since judges quite constantly invoke policy and distribu-
tive considerations in their determination and justification of common law rules.  
I turn now to more theoretical concerns. Defenders of the view that private law should 
be free from policy often argue that this should be so, because the introduction of policy con-
siderations into private law will necessarily render that area of law incoherent.15 But the strat-
egy represented in Table 1 does not avoid the problem of incoherence (assuming it is a prob-
lem), it only shoves it out of the private lawyer’s sight. So long as private law and public law 
come into contact, the clashes between principle and policy, between rights and general wel-
fare, between corrective and distributive justice are not avoided, they are moved somewhere 
else. If anything, the strategy that insists on somehow not talking about these interactions, on 
 





engaging in private law as if public law does not exist (and vice versa), only makes the prob-
lem worse.  
Finally, for this view to be plausible there has to be something about judges that explains 
why they should decide certain questions and not democratic institutions. The typical answer 
democracies give to this question is that they allocate law-making power to non-democratic 
bodies when these bodies have special expertise on certain matters. Following this rationale, it 
makes sense to give this power if there is something about judges that lends credence to the 
idea that they are experts on identifying true, universal morality. Though such claims are 
sometimes made, it is entirely unclear what they are based on. Despite the veneration still 
accorded to appellate judges, most judges have not left a mark on history as particularly origi-
nal or insightful thinkers, and very few of them would make it to any list of history’s greatest 
moral thinkers. To even make sense, we should believe that there is something in the training 
or occupation of judges that makes them moral experts, but there is little reason to think that. 
For myself, I am not sure what would count as moral expertise, but if repeated engagement 
with moral questions had been shown to sharpen one’s moral sensibilities, moral philosophers 
would have made better candidates for the judiciary than lawyers. At the very least, for this 
claim to make sense, we would have expected judges to immerse themselves in the writings of 
moral philosophers (rather than those of lawyers) as a precondition for getting the job.  
C. Common Law Universalism 
The two positions just outlined correspond, at least roughly, to one understanding of the di-
vide between two familiar legal philosophies: legal positivism and natural law. These two ap-
proaches dominate jurisprudential discussions to such an extent that they seem to exhaust the 
theoretical space. These two views, however, neglect a third position, one that is in fact the 
most popular within in the common law world (outside the United States). This approach 
sees a special unity among all common law jurisdictions but not between common law and 
non-common law jurisdictions. In other words, proponents of this view take a midway posi-
tion between the two views considered earlier. To many common lawyers this view comes so 
naturally that they hardly bother to think about the fact that if they write on the law of con-
tract, they may take particular interest in the judicial pronouncements of their own jurisdic-
tion, but they will also closely follow developments in other common law jurisdictions. On 
the other hand, they will make much less of an effort to keep track with developments in the 
law of contract of non-common law jurisdictions, even when those non-common law juris-
dictions (as is the case in Canada or Britain) belong to their own country! This view is not 
meant as a mere description of reality: as mentioned, many think that this view implies that 
common law systems ought to converge.  
Can we make sense of this view? From the perspective of universalist natural law, this 
view seems odd. It asks us to assume, in effect, that all legal (or moral) wisdom descended on 
certain parts of the world and not on others. From the perspective of the localist view, this 





independent countries. The key to understanding the common law convergence view is that it 
presupposes a distinct view of authority, one that sees the authority of law (or at least the au-
thority of the common law) as grounded in history. On this mode of authority, we ought to 
do certain things in a particular way today, because of the fact that we did certain things in a 
similar way in the past.  
This view thus asks us to derive an ought from an is. Could such a view ever be justified? 
Several arguments have been proposed in defence of this view, but here I will only consider 
one. This view maintains that we can make of our duties to others only by assuming our 
membership in a community; they further argue that the content of those obligations is nei-
ther a product of some social contract nor derived from reason. Rather, it derives from the 
history of that community. It is this history that shapes our normative realities and it implies 
that it is only through an engagement with the community’s political past that we can identify 
our present-day obligations to other members of the community.  
A key element to this view is the idea of a tradition, not merely as a description of a cer-
tain set of ideas, but as a normative concept.16 By ‘tradition’ I mean an amalgamation of pre-
vailing ideas and concepts in a particular community combined with a more-or-less conscious 
sense of participation in a joint endeavour with past members of that community. Whatever 
are the normative merits of this view, there are many reasons to think that the common law 
tradition embraces something like this view. Legal rules are often developed by careful atten-
tion to past practice rather than by direct appeal to reason.  
This idea is in plain sight with the doctrine of precedent. Within a broadly Hartian ver-
sion of legal positivism precedents create rules (or at least parts of rules). Precedent on this 
view is simply a different technique of promulgating legal rules. Within the natural law view 
precedents are understood as an ongoing enterprise seeking to find out what the law is. 
Different decisions reflect the ongoing enterprise of discovering moral truth, but by them-
selves precedents have no significance: like the rest of the law, their authority derives from 
their content, if it corresponds to morality. From this perspective past decisions are merely a 
repository of attempts at discovering moral truths whose existence and content is entirely in-
dependent of legal practice. This is the background that explains why both views find it a real 
puzzle why we should follow a ‘wrong’ precedent, a precedent that we now judge to be incon-
sistent with the requirements of morality. But this problem is entirely the product of the as-
sumption that what we ought to do is fixed outside of our practices. If this assumption is re-
jected—as it is within this understanding of the authority of the common law—the problem 
does not arise, or rather arises in a much more attenuated form. So long as we can show that 
the precedent itself followed on the tradition, it makes little sense to claim that the precedent 
 
16 For a very strong version of this view, especially in relation to precedent, see Anthony T Kronman, ‘Prece-
dent and Tradition’ (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1029; cf Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘Political Languages in Time—The 
Work of J.G.A. Pocock’ (1984) 14 British Journal of Political Science 89, 105 (‘The notion of tradition which is so 
essential to an understanding of precedent-based behaviours pervades…[Pocock’s] work, and plays a key role in his 





is ‘wrong’. On this view precedents can only be seen as wrong when they can be shown to be 
wrong ‘the day they were decided’, i.e. when they can be shown to be themselves departures 
from the requirements of the tradition, not of some universal moral standard.17   
The greatest strength of this account for our purposes is that it provides a ready explana-
tion for the view that finds divergences among common law jurisdictions problematic but is 
indifferent to divergences between common law systems and other legal systems. To see this, 
contrast the tradition view with a different view that was once used to explain common law 
convergence. Around the turn of the twentieth century one finds Anglophone legal scholars 
speaking of a ‘national character’ shared by the English-speaking world. Whether such a thing 
as a national character even exists is suspect,18 but even if it did, on this view the fact of com-
mon law convergence (and common law–non-common law divergence) would be explained 
by the tendency of nations having laws that match their national ‘traits’.19 This view thus 
strongly suggests that common law convergence would emerge naturally and without con-
scious attempt at maintaining convergence.  
Though not without difficulties, the tradition view can provide a less mysterious basis for 
both explaining the fact of common law convergence. Since different common law countries 
share a history, we have an explanation for the fact of convergence. But unlike the national 
character explanation, the tradition view also provides an argument for maintaining conver-
gence. A tradition, in the way I use it here, involves participation in a joint endeavour and 
implies that those jurisdictions that belong to a single tradition, will have reason to uphold 
the tradition, not because it is a tradition and not simply out of respect for the past, but be-
cause of their present commitment to the continued existence of the community constituted 
and epitomized by the tradition. To the extent that the tradition is (seen to be) made up of all 
jurisdictions that derive from the common law of England, all of them should be committed 
to maintaining their convergence. Since there is no similar tradition tying common law juris-
 
17 For a clear example see R v R [1992] 1 AC 599, where the House of Lords repudiated the doctrine that a 
man cannot rape his wife. Most of the decision was focused on the weak precedential force of the doctrine, with a 
short discussion on changing moral and social standards with little or no discussion about the timeless wrongness 
of this view. In fact, the decision stated that it rejected ‘reflected the state of affairs in these respects at the time it 
was enunciated’. Ibid., 616.  
18 For reasons to doubt see A Terracciano et al, ‘National Character Does Not Reflect Mean Personality Trait 
Levels in 49 Cultures’ (2005) 310 Science 96. 
19 See e.g., AV Dicey, ‘A Common Citizenship for the English Race’ (1897) 71 Contemporary Review 457, 
468–69; James Bryce, ‘The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the Development of 
the Common Law’ (1907) 8 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 203, 203–04, 206–08. I do not address 
here the question of the scope of convergence, but it is interesting to note in this context that those who talk of the 
importance of convergence in the common law almost always talk of between England, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and to a lesser extent the United States. Much less is said of the importance of convergence with India, by 
far the populous common law country; nor, for that matter, with the thirty-odd jurisdictions for which the Privy 





dictions with civil law jurisdictions, there is no normative requirement for maintaining con-
vergence with them.  
In this respect the common law universalism view is the mirror image of legal universal-
ism (this is important to highlight, since both views are sometimes called ‘natural law’): the 
tradition view limits the scope of convergence, and in this respect it subscribes to a weaker 
ideal of convergence, but in another sense it endorses a much stronger version of it. Unlike 
legal universalism (as well as, of course, legal localism) this view sees convergence by itself, i.e. 
convergence regardless of what legal systems converge on, as valuable. Of course, once a tradi-
tion settles on a path, then straying from that path is wrong; this is the sense in which a tradi-
tion has normative force. But the path itself is not inherently better than other paths: it is just 
a different one.20  
The tradition view of the common law also has an answer to the puzzle of authority of 
the common law. The common law is not democratic in the majoritarian sense, nor is derived 
from the authority of the state. The common law is justified for its ability to maintain the 
deep currents of thought of a particular community, one that in the case of the common law 
(so the argument would go) extends beyond state boundaries. This last point also helps us 
identify another explanatory advantage of this view over legal universalism, namely that it 
better fits legal practice and the role judges have in it. To justify the allocation of decision-
making power to judges the legal universalist must hold that judges are moral experts, that 
they are better than others in finding moral truths. The proponent of the common law tradi-
tion view maintains the far more plausible view that judges are experts in the common law 
tradition. It is exactly for this reason that a large part of their training and working life is ded-
icating to mastering past legal materials (and not in the work of moral philosophers). That is 
also why in writing their decisions they consult and cite past cases: not just, perhaps not even 
primarily, in order to economize on their time and effort by not having to think from scratch 
on legal questions presented to them. From the common law tradition view, the act of con-
sulting past cases and trying to find the answer in them (or perhaps through them) reflects the 
ongoing commitments derived from being part of a non-universal tradition. This perspective 
also gives as the means for understanding and explaining how the common law can change, as 
it is influenced by changing ideas, but also why it changes so slowly. Unlike universalism that 
assumes that moral constants remain largely unchanged, the common law tradition view can 
explain how two legal decisions from different era can both be different from each other, 
without having to hold that either decision was wrong. 
Yet another advantage of this view is that it can explain how the common law can be po-
litical in one sense—it reflects certain political commitments (for instance, a certain concep-
tion of liberty)—while remaining apolitical in another—as its political commitments are dis-
 
20 Stevens says so explicitly: ‘Legal systems have their own internal logic. Saying that the common law of 
torts is rights-based, while other legal systems are not, is not intended to be an implicit reprimand of other ways of 





tinct from the everyday politics of majoritarian democracy. Against this background we can 
make sense of why this view of the authority of the common law is also unsympathetic to pol-
icy. It is not because policy reflects an intrusion of politics per se into the domain of law; it is 
rather the intrusion of the wrong kind of politics, the kind of everyday politics which is the 
proper domain of government and majoritarian democracy. This explains why many defend-
ers of ‘blackletter law’ insist on the autonomy of law and legal scholarship: though the law 
will be influenced by popular views, those can only be relevant to the law to the extent that 
they are manifested in, or translated into, ‘internal’ legal categories. It is only by insisting on 
the relative closure of law, by avoiding the ‘intrusion’ of ideas from other disciplines (either 
directly or through legislation, where such ideas are more likely to have an impact) that the 
common law tradition can be maintained.  
Even though this view provides a more convincing account of certain familiar features of 
the common law than either localism or universalism, it is surprisingly absent from jurispru-
dential discussions.21 This is probably because in present-day moral discourse the usual as-
sumption is that our moral obligations are fixed constants, true regardless of our acceptance or 
recognition of them. Most jurisprudential debates—and both legal positivists and natural 
lawyers—assume that the law is on the lookout for those fixed constants, which it aims to 
match. Much of what one sees in actual common law practice amounts to a rejection of this 
view.  
This view is, of course, not without its difficulties. One set of concerns (at least for some) 
is that this view tends to be conservative. A different set of concerns has to do with the fuzzy 
concept of ‘tradition’. Much historical work has been dedicated to showing that how tradi-
tions are invented or manufactured.22 The common law tradition is no exception. English 
common law is originally in fact the law of the Norman (French) conquerors. In the centuries 
that followed, English lawyers continued to draw unselfconsciously on Roman law and their 
civilian contemporaries. As recently as the late nineteenth century, when English (and Ameri-
can) lawyers had to construct a theory for the case-law after the collapse of the writ system, 
they relied heavily treatises on civil law.  
In a way, these historical facts are on their own of relatively little significance, because 
traditions depend on a continued commitment to the perpetuation of a myth. So long as the 
myth is believed, it can provide the sufficient normative foundation for its continued exist-
ence. Of course, traditions can (and often have been) challenged for their inaccuracy; but it is 
 
21 The most systematic attempt to develop such ideas in the context of the common law has been provided 
by Postema. See e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
63–77. The work of Ronald Dworkin (perhaps unconsciously) bears important similarities (as well as important 
dissimilarities) with this view, but it is rare to see his work discussed outside the legal positivism/natural law di-
chotomy. The matter is discussed at length in Dan Priel, ‘Making Some Sense of Nonsense Jurisprudence’ (un-
published manuscript). 
22 See Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-





typically not historians alone that topple a tradition. It is interesting to note, however, that 
those who wish to create greater convergence among all European legal systems have worked 
hard on creating an opposite narrative, one that emphasizes the historical links among all 
those legal systems that are together said to have contributed to—surprise!—a single ‘Western’ 
or ‘European legal tradition’.23 
D. Complicating the Picture 
As stated at the beginning of this section, the account provided so far in this section is some-
what simplified. This is because it does not adequately cover all possible answers to the ques-
tion of the authority of the common law. This simplification was attained by distinguishing 
between the view that all law derives its authority from the state, all law derives its authority 
from correspondence with external moral standards, and the view that draws a sharp divide 
between the common law and statute with regard to their authority. These three views can 
thus be presented in the following tables: 
 
 Universal Common law Local 
Statutes 
Common law 
Table 2: The state law conception of authority 
  Universal Common law Local 
Statutes 
Common law 
Table 3: The natural law conception of authority 
 Universal Common law Local 
Statutes 
Common law 
Table 4: The common law conception of authority24 
Tables 2–4 present three distinct and non-overlapping models of authority. The tables are 
useful also for highlighting other possible configurations of the authority of law. Some of 
these may not be adopted by anyone, but others are live possibilities. As we have seen, howev-
er, proponents of both the natural law and the common law models have attempted to ad-
 
23 See, for example, Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and European Culture’ [2007] New Zealand Law 
Review 341, 365–72. 
24 The scholars I focus on tend to write on private law and their views on the authority of statute is not al-
ways clear. Many, it seems, favour the kind of division of authority represented by Table 5. If there are adherents to 
the view represented by Table 4, perhaps they are best represented by some of the proponents of common law con-





dress the shortcomings of their approach, both positive and normative, by defending a weaker 
position that typically looks more like this: 
 Universal Common law Local 
Statutes 
Common law () ()
Table 5: Mixed conceptions of authority 
There are possibly other ways in which the different basic approaches may intersect. A longer 
essay might have attempted a more elaborate taxonomy. But since legal taxonomies only serve 
as useful models of reality, there is a point at which an over-elaborate model obscures more 
than it illuminates. 
There is another important way in which the picture presented so far may seem to be a 
simplification of reality. I indicated that the view summarized in Table 2 corresponds with 
American common law, the view summarized in Table 3 is more commonly an academic view, 
and the view summarized in Table 4 as reflecting English common law. Of course, reality is 
more complicated than that. One can find examples of people or courts in the United States 
who express views that are closer to the second or third approach, just as one can find outside 
the United States people who express views quite similar to the first.25 Once one goes beyond 
models more subtle differences arise. For example, even when tradition-based positions are 
defended in the context of American law, three facts are notable. First, such arguments are 
more commonly directed at explaining and justifying the common law that engulfs the Unit-
ed States Constitution as well as courts’ power of judicial review, rather than the common law 
of contract and tort. This reflects the fact that at least among legal academics, it is the Consti-
tution, rather than the common law, that is more commonly seen these days as the source of 
Americans’ communal commitments.26 Traditional common law, decided by state courts by 
(usually) elected judges and often on the basis of legislation, has less significance in the Amer-
ican polity. Second and related, even Americans sympathetic to the idea of law as a tradition 
 
25 Even this might be challenged. American law, much more than other common law jurisdictions, is com-
mitted to the ‘natural law’ idea that sees no clear distinction between law and morality and that is willing to infuse 
moral ideas into the law whether or not they have been formally incorporated by a legislative statement. See P.S. 
Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, 
Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 43–46. It is notable, however, that when moral 
norms are being incorporated, what is often said to be incorporated are norms accepted by the American public, 
not universal moral criteria. 
26 For a tradition-based justification of judge-made constitutional law see David A Strauss, ‘Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 877, 891–94, 900–03, 929–30. For a simi-
lar answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty of judicial review of legislation see Alexander Bickel, The Least 






now see the ‘American way of law’27 as a distinct tradition, one that despite its historical roots 
to English common law, has long since charted its own distinct path founded on distinctly 
American values. Finally, it seems to me that the American approach is more open to the in-
fluence of contemporary prevailing values from without, rather than to the reasoned elaboration 
of past legal materials in order to derive certain normative commitments from within. This, 
again, is a reflection of the greater role for ideas of self-government in the American version of 
the common law, rather than the elitist enterprise which is more characteristic of the common 
law approach elsewhere.28 
III. Implications 
The last section has already explored some ways in which these ‘philosophical’ differences 
manifest themselves in differences in legal practice, for instance by providing an explanation 
to the unique American practice of elected judges. I have also attempted to show that these 
different ways of thinking about the common law also lead to different attitudes on the ques-
tion of the significance of convergence. In this section I explore this matter further by looking 
more concretely into one manifestation of the question of common law convergence, namely 
the attitude toward reliance on foreign legal materials. Perhaps more intriguingly, I then turn 
to a substantive question, the scope of negligence liability of public authorities. I will try to 
show that the divergence in views in recent House of Lords decision on the matter can be ex-
plained, at least in part, by drawing on the ideas canvassed in this essay. 
A. The Use of Comparative Law in Private Law 
Basil Markesinis has been an indefatigable champion of the value of reliance on foreign law, 
and while he has been able to find many adherents to the cause in Europe (including Eng-
land), he has been frustrated and puzzled by most Americans’ lack of interest in foreign law 
 
27 I borrow this phrase from Robert A Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). See also the series of twelve articles exploring ‘commonplace aspects of the Ameri-
can justice system that are virtually unique in the world’, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/news/us/series/american_exception/ (visited 2 Dec. 2014). For a more partisan argument that American law 
and society were created in conscious opposition to the legal systems and ideas of the Old World see Steven G 
Calabresi, ‘“A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on 
Foreign Law’ (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 1335. 
28 For more on the American case see Priel (n 6) section II.(b)–(c). See also Dan Priel, ‘The Law and Politics 
of Unjust Enrichment’ (2013) 63 University of Toronto Law Journal 533. In the latter essay I exploited these different 
understandings of law as the basis for explaining Americans’ lack of interest in unjust enrichment. Without using 
the terminology used in this essay, I argued there that the thriving of unjust enrichment is the product of a need to 
solve problems with areas of law within a tradition-based conception of authority of the common law, which does 
not allow for radical changes in those areas of law. When those concerns are absent, there is less need for a distinct 





and outright resistance to relying on it in developing their law.29 His attempts at explaining 
this failure have focused mostly on what he perceived to be tactical errors made by American 
proponents of the use of foreign law. He admonished them for failing to answer questions like 
whether foreign law can be used to restrict or enlarge constitutional rights, or their use of 
‘strong and emotive language’.30 These are unconvincing explanations.31 There is no recogni-
tion in any of the opponents’ writing on the matter that it is the incompleteness of the pro-
ponents’ arguments that is the basis of their opposition. The language used is also a poor ex-
planation. Opponents of same-sex marriage in the United States have also used strong and 
emotive language, and yet on that matter their opponents are losing ground fast. What is 
completely absent from Markesinis writings on the matter is any serious attempt to consider 
the significance of ideas.32 
Though Markesinis’s remarks are general, he expressed particular dismay at Americans’ 
unwillingness to look at foreign law in the ‘the domains of contract or tort’,33 stating also that 
‘the introvertedness or self-sufficiency of Americans is now spreading to, should I say infecting, 
private law as well as public law where, at least, one can make with greater cogency the argu-
ment about democracy being trumped by unelected officials, namely judges’.34 These remarks 
reveal Markesinis’s own normative commitments, and his unwillingness to recognize that the 
source of the resistance is ideological. Markesinis assumes that public law and private law have 
different sources of authority, which explains why he thinks private law is more readily appro-
priate for comparative law. This is not a description of what things are in the world; it follows 
from a particular political position, one that itself sees public law as the product of local poli-
tics but private law as something else. But my anecdotal experience is that the idea that there 
is a fundamental distinction between private and public law is one that many American law-
yers reject, and if my explanation above is correct, we can see why.  
 
29 See Basil Markesinis, ‘National Self-Sufficiency or Intellectual Arrogance: The Current Attitude of Ameri-
can Courts towards Foreign Law’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 301. 
30 Ibid., 311.  
31 For an illuminating exploration of the strengths and limitations of reliance on foreign law, as well as a val-
uable critique of Markesinis (albeit rather different from mine) see Jane Stapleton, ‘Benefits of Comparative Tort 
Reasoning: Lost in Translation’ in Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Tom Bingham and the Transformation 
of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 773. 
32 Markesinis is sceptical to the idea of ‘legal culture’ as having much explanatory power in Basil Markesinis, 
‘Judicial Mentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor Impeding Recourse to Foreign Law’ (2006) 80 
Tulane Law Review 1325, 1356 n 89.  
33 Markesinis (n 29) 324. 
34 Basil Markesinis, ‘Understanding American Law by Looking at It through Foreign Eyes: Towards a Wider 
Theory for the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (2006) 81 Tulane Law Review 123, 171. See also his remark that ‘it 
does not take much ingenuity but only a minimum amount of disingenuousness to claim that, for instance, even 
ordinary contract and tort rules can be linked to “values” held dear by some societies in order to preserve the status 





When the political presuppositions that underlie Markesinis’s views are brought to the 
fore, what he takes to be obvious—that examining foreign law is conducive to the ‘search for 
truth and justice’35—appears much less obvious than he presents it. Markesinis fails to under-
stand that what counts as ‘justice’ (or at least ‘justice according to law’) and what counts as 
‘truth’ with regard to a proposition of law, depends on an underlying political philosophy. In a 
political community that sees its legal justice and legal truth as derived from the will of its 
people, the use of foreign law is a subversion of truth and justice, whether or not the law in 
question is a common law jurisdiction.36 Of course, not all Americans accept this view, and 
there are many who see value in reference to foreign law. But if we seek to understand their 
views, there are often best explained by the presupposition that at least part of the law is 
grounded in different notions of authority, most notably its correspondence to universal hu-
man rights.  
B. Implications for Substantive Private Law 
In this section, I turn to a more speculative suggestion. I will attempt to show that different 
views about the authority of the common law and the value of common law convergence cor-
respond in a non-coincidental way to different attitudes to the question of negligence liability 
of public authorities. To demonstrate this point, I will compare the views of Lords Bingham 
and Hoffmann, probably Britain’s most influential judges of the last two decades. 
Bingham and Hoffmann have expressed rather different views on the value of compara-
tive law, especially when it came from European, civil law countries. Bingham was a lifelong 
champion of ‘widening the horizons’ of English law.37 Hoffmann, by contrast, has always 
been more sceptical of European influences on indigenous English law.38 Where Bingham 
thought the European Convention of Human Rights was a document of surpassing signifi-
 
35 Markesinis (n 34) 170. 
36 See Roper v Simmons, (2005) 543 US 551, 626–27 (Scalia J, dissenting) (‘The [majority’s] special reliance on 
the laws of the United Kingdom is perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion….It is beyond comprehension 
why we should look…to a country that has developed, in the century since the Revolutionary War—and with 
increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated 
by continental jurists—a legal, political, and social culture quite different from our own.’). On the proliferation of 
statutes across the United States that prohibit judicial reliance on any foreign law see Andrea Elliott, ‘The Man 
Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement’, New York Times (30 July 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/ 
31/us/31shariah.html (visited 2 Dec. 2014). 
37 See Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons: The Influence of Comparative Law and International Law on Domes-
tic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Tom Bingham, ‘“There Is a World Elsewhere”: The 
Changing Perspectives of English Law’ in The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches 1985–1999 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 87. See also his remark in Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 1 AC 32 at [32]: ‘In a shrink-
ing world…there must be some virtue to uniformity in outcome whatever the diversity of approach in reaching 
that outcome’. 
38 See Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 159; Leonard 





cance for its affirmation of universal human rights,39 Hoffmann thought the very idea of uni-
versal human rights close to incoherent, and has defended instead ‘the essentially national 
character of rights’.40 Where Bingham wrote of ‘our law has been enriched by the injection of 
international jurisprudence, emanating from [the European Court of Human Rights in] 
Strasbourg, and binding on the UK in international law’,41 Hoffmann expressed doubts about 
the very legitimacy of that court.42  
This difference also played itself out in Bingham and Hoffmann’s respective judicial 
opinions. In a case dealing with the legality of indefinite detention of foreign nationals in 
British prisons, Bingham, relying on extensive analysis of European legal materials, rejected 
the government’s position and declared some legislation incompatible with the European 
Convention. Hoffmann reached the same conclusion, but on wholly different grounds. He 
thought that it is the affirmation of ‘a quintessentially British liberty’ that supports the peti-
tioners, not any European jurisprudence. His speech reads as a textbook statement of the view 
that sees the common law as a unique political tradition:  
I would not like anyone to think that we are concerned with some special doctrine of European 
law. Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is a quintessentially British liberty, enjoyed by 
the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be thrown into 
prison at the whim of their rulers. It was incorporated into the European Convention in order 
to entrench the same liberty in countries which had recently been under Nazi occupation. The 
United Kingdom subscribed to the Convention because it set out the rights which British sub-
jects enjoyed under the common law….43 
The “nation” is a social organism, living in its territory (in this case, the United Kingdom) under 
its own form of government and subject to a system of laws which expresses its own political 
and moral values. When one speaks of a threat to the “life” of the nation, the word life is being 
used in a metaphorical sense. The life of the nation is not coterminous with the lives of its peo-
ple. The nation, its institutions and values, endure through generations. In many important re-
 
39 Bingham, Widening Horizons (n 37) 83. 
40 Hoffmann, ‘Universality’ (n 38) 417; Lord Hoffmann, ‘Bentham and Human Rights’ (2001) 54 Current Le-
gal Problems 61, 74–76. Curiously, in both these essays Hoffmann invoked the authority of Bentham in support of 
his views, even though Bentham was a cosmopolitan if there ever was one. See Philip Schofield, ‘The Legal and 
Political Legacy of Jeremy Bentham’ (2013) 13 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 51, 61–62, and sources cited 
therein. 
41 Bingham, Widening Horizons (n 37) 82. 
42 Hoffmann, ‘Universality’ (n 38) 429–30.  
43 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 at [88]; cf Bryce (n 19) 
204–05; Kenneth Minogue, ‘The Elusive Oakeshott’, The American Conservative (Oct. 2009) 24, 25 (‘The idea of 
human rights [Oakeshott] thought a rather second-rate caricature of the inherited Common Law freedoms of 
English-speaking peoples’). Contrary to Hoffmann (see note 40), Oakeshott recognized Bentham as an enemy of 
tradition. See Michael Oakeshott, ‘The New Bentham’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, expanded edn 
(Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1991) 132, 139. As indeed he was. See Jeremy Bentham, ‘The Book of Fallacies’ in John 





spects, England is the same nation as it was at the time of the first Elizabeth or the Glorious 
Revolution. The Armada threatened to destroy the life of the nation, not by loss of life in battle, 
but by subjecting English institutions to the rule of Spain and the Inquisition. The same was 
true of the threat posed to the United Kingdom by Nazi Germany in the Second World War. 
This country, more than any other in the world, has an unbroken history of living for centuries 
under institutions and in accordance with values which show a recognisable continuity.44  
So far, Bingham and Hoffmann’s respective views seem to reflect two competing conceptions 
of authority. I would like to tie these differences now to a substantive question of law on 
which they expressed widely divergent views, namely the scope of negligence liability of pub-
lic authority. In an essay entitled ‘The Uses of Tort Law’ Bingham criticized the majority’s 
view in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,45 a case in which a majority of the House of 
Lords (against Bingham’s sole dissent) held that police forces owe no duty of care to individu-
als for failure to prevent them from being attacked, even when the individual provides the 
police with specific information about the prospect of being subject to a violent attack by a 
particular, identified, individual. Bingham concluded his essay with these words: 
If the virtual immunity now extended by English law to large areas of police activity were re-
moved, there would no doubt be a cost falling, directly or indirectly, on the community who 
fund the service. If economy were all, the present law has its virtue. But if a member of the pub-
lic whom a public service exists to serve suffers significant injury or loss through the culpable fault 
or reprehensible failure of that service to act as it should, is it not consistent with ethical and, 
perhaps, democratic principle that the many, responsible for funding the service, should bear 
the cost of compensating the victim? I shall leave that as a rhetorical question, confident that 
my own answer to it is clear.46 
At almost the same time, Lord Hoffmann delivered the Bar Council Law Reform Lecture, 
which dealt with the question of negligence liability of public authorities. In his lecture 
Hoffmann stated: 
Some people said that it was illogical that highway authorities should have what they called an 
immunity from liability for non-repair. But that immunity was exactly the same as everyone else 
had. No one owed a private law duty to repair the highway. The highway authority owed a pub-
 
44 A (n 43) [91]. The Human Rights Act, Hoffmann said, allows courts to declare that a statute ‘is incompat-
ible with the human rights of persons in this country….The declaration of the court enables Parliament to choose 
with full knowledge that the law does not accord with our constitutional traditions’. Ibid., [90] (emphasis added). 
45 [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] AC 225. The case was decided together with the case Van Colle v Chief Constable 
of Hertfordshire Police, by which name the joint case is known. 
46 Lord Bingham, ‘The Uses of Tort’ (2010) 1 Journal of European Tort Law 3, 15 (emphasis added). See also 





lic law duty to repair, but that, as a matter of ancient policy, was not enforceable in private 
law.47 
There is no way the difference between these two statements can be reconciled by context or 
nuance. What Bingham called ‘virtual immunity’ enjoyed by the police, Hoffmann disparaged 
as ‘what [some people] called an immunity’. These two statements reflect two divergent phi-
losophies. Bingham’s claim is grounded in a particular view on the obligations a democratic 
state owes its citizens. By contrast, Hoffmann adopts the libertarian view that treats the state 
and police officers acting on its behalf as a kind of private actors. It is true that Hoffmann’s 
concession with regard to the existence of a public law duty complicates the picture, but not 
by much. By drawing the distinction Hoffmann affirms that members of the public do not 
have a standing, as citizens, to demand that a public authority perform its duties and then 
seek compensation when their failure leads to their injury. In this way he keeps the two 
branches of law (and their underlying authorities) separate. This implies is a fundamentally 
different view of the relationship between individuals and the state than Bingham’s. 
Hoffmann’s suggestion that the state is treated just like any other person has a semblance 
of neutrality: in the eyes of private law we are all equal. Except that, of course, it does not. 
Parents are treated differently from others with regard to their children; employers are treated 
differently from others with regard to their employees; doctors are treated differently from 
others with regard to their patients. By treating the state in this context as a stranger, Hoff-
mann equates (for the purposes of tort law) public bodies’ provision of services to a stranger’s 
act of charity.48   
Do the differences on the proper place of European and comparative law in English law 
and their different views on the question of the scope of tort liability of public authorities 
have anything in common? Though it is difficult to answer this question with certitude, I be-
lieve the answer is ‘yes’. At one level, Bingham’s legal cosmopolitanism may have been influ-
enced by the fact that the outcome he favoured was available in other jurisdictions. This is not 
much of a speculation since Bingham surveyed the law regarding tort liability of public au-
thorities in several common law and civil law jurisdictions and stated that Van Colle would 
 
47 Lord Hoffmann, ‘Reforming the Law of Public Authority Negligence’ (The Bar Council Law Reform Lec-
ture, 17 Nov. 2009) 3, available at http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/100362/lord_hoffmann_s_transcript 
_171109.pdf (visited 2 Dec. 2014). Hoffmann expressed similar views in his judicial capacity in, among other places, 
Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 
1057. However, it is interesting that Hoffmann adopted the exact opposite view when it served restricting tort liabil-
ity against the state. In a nuisance case against public authorities, Hoffmann stated that the question of evaluating 
the defendant’s reasonableness ‘becomes very different when one is dealing with the capital expenditure of a statu-
tory undertaking providing public utilities on a large scale’. Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66, 
[2004] 2 AC 42 at [63]. 
48 Howarth has pointedly summarized Hoffmann’s view as ‘affirm[ing] the extraordinary rule…that the pub-
lic rescue services have no duty to rescue anyone’. David Howarth, ‘Public Authority Non-Liability: Spinning Out 





have been decided differently ‘in most of the world’s leading jurisdictions’.49 Such a finding 
can influence a judge in two ways. Factually, showing that liability has been imposed on the 
police in other jurisdictions in similar circumstances provides some assurance that the legal 
rule he proposed is not crazy and that it is unlikely to have seriously detrimental effects if 
adopted. This may have been particularly important in the context of liability of public au-
thorities, as a familiar argument for the restricting public authority liability is its potentially 
deleterious effects.50 In this respect, legal decisions from other jurisdictions can serve as a 
source of empirical data that may be more readily accessible to judges than more rigorous em-
pirical studies. Normatively, Bingham’s openness to European law has led him to embrace the 
view that common law duties should aim to correspond to human rights principles derived 
from European jurisprudence, thus promoting greater convergence between English and Eu-
ropean law.51 
I think, however, that the link between Bingham’s views on legal convergence and his 
views on the scope negligence liability of public authorities runs deeper than that. Bingham’s 
basis for the imposition of liability in Smith rests on his conception of what the state owes 
individuals and his views on European convergence stem from a single intellectual source: 
universal human rights. In the context of liability of public authorities, it has led him to for-
mulate a liability principle without which, he thought, the law ‘fails to perform the basic 
function for which such a law exists’.52 And a fundamental function of that law—tort law—is 
to protect human rights.53 As he put it, a democratic state that cares for human rights is obli-
gated to the ‘democratic principle that the many, responsible for funding the service, should 
bear the cost of compensating the victim’. This duty is very different from the duties that 
oblige other individuals, and failure to maintain it can amount to a commission of a tort. 
Hoffmann’s opposing substantive view is not simply based on the claim that the state is 
treated the same as individuals. That, as we have seen, is a clearly unsatisfactory argument. 
Once we acknowledge the significance he accords to the common law tradition, we can see a 
more plausible explanation for his view. The deep thread Hoffmann finds in the common law 
tradition—what he calls ‘the quintessentially British liberty’—is the negative liberty of protec-
tion from unlawful arrest. What he could not find in that tradition is the kind of relationship 
between the state and its citizens (he calls them ‘subjects’) that underlies Bingham’s view. 
What about the possible objection that the existence of an ancient British liberty does not 
preclude the possibility of creating new duties derived from public law? To this Hoffmann 
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50 See Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] AC 53, 63; Van Colle (n 45) [74]–[77], [108], [132]–
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replies, once again appealing to tradition, that it is ‘ancient wisdom’ that public law rights 
cannot be the basis for private law remedies. 
IV. The Future of a Common Law World 
Earlier in this essay I attributed to the common law tradition view the idea that ‘common law 
jurisdictions ought to converge by appeal to the normative force of commitment to a shared 
tradition’. A crucial word here is ‘commitment’: a tradition requires a certain normative atti-
tude that seeks its perpetuation. When this commitment is gone, a tradition can disintegrate 
fairly quickly. Unlike the United States, which broke its ties with Britain from its inception, 
the Commonwealth nations maintained close political and legal links with Britain, and they 
also inherited the British political system of parliamentary supremacy and a more modest role 
for popular sovereignty. In line with that political tradition, the tradition view of the common 
law remained dominant, a fact that helps explain the continued commitment in these coun-
tries to maintaining common law convergence. And yet, in recent years we witness declining 
convergence even there.54 In this section I try to explain why this process is taking place and 
why it is likely to continue apace. 
Contrary to Stevens’s view that ‘as common lawyers we are part of the same family 
whether we like it or not’,55 my view is that within the tradition view convergence is the 
product of more-or-less conscious decisions on the part of legal practitioners to maintain 
commonality. When this effort disappears, two formerly close legal systems will tend naturally 
to drift apart. This point is crucial to understanding the tradition view and for highlighting 
another important contrast between it and the universalist view. Apart from the differences 
mentioned earlier, these two views are likely to see the process of convergence as proceeding 
according to a wholly different pattern. The universal view convergence can emerge ‘naturally’ 
as a result of two different jurisdictions identifying (possibly completely independently of 
each other) the requirements of universal morality. After all, according to this view the re-
quirements of morality are accessible to all rational creatures, and so a process of trial and er-
ror should eventually lead all legal systems to converge. An imperfect analogy is the biological 
concept of convergent evolution, where two species develop similar traits independently of 
each other because of similar evolutionary pressures. This view can see reason as imposing 
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55 Robert Stevens, ‘The Divergence of the Australian and English Law of Torts’ in Simone Degeling et al. 





similar pressures on all humans, pressures that ultimately should lead their laws to converge. 
(That this does not happen in reality is reason to doubt the veracity of this picture.) 
This process is very different from the tradition view, where history and path dependence 
are crucial for what counts as a right answer today, and therefore convergence is extremely 
unlikely to emerge naturally. I will elaborate on this point with the aid of a simple model. 
This model can be loosely analogized, once again borrowing from evolutionary biology, to 
speciation, the process (or rather set of processes) by which a single species splits into two. On 
the tradition view maintaining convergence requires an effort to master the legal materials of 
more than one jurisdiction and guaranteeing that they proceed relatively in tandem. This is 
because on this view there are no right answers in the abstract; rather, right answers to out-
standing or novel legal questions emerge from past decisions. It follows from this point that 
maintaining convergence between jurisdictions has costs, the most obvious being that doing 
so requires attaining and mastering more legal materials that are less accessible. Historically, 
part of the difficulty may have been simply physical: it was more difficult to have access to all 
the law reports and academic commentary from another country. These days, when access to 
legal materials from all over the world is much easier, the problem may be the opposite: the 
ease of access to legal materials from all over the world results in an overwhelming glut that 
discourages straying too far beyond one’s own jurisdiction. Either way, this cost is enough that 
without effort small differences will tend to emerge between the two jurisdictions, and those 
can fairly quickly become larger and therefore increasingly difficult to overcome. Once paths 
begin to diverge, the costs of using legal materials from another jurisdiction increase, as that 
jurisdiction begins to use different concepts, use similar words with somewhat different mean-
ing, and develop the common law against a different statutory background. In this way small 
differences grow bigger until use of materials from that jurisdiction becomes too costly to 
bother.    
At least when divergences are small, the costs of maintaining convergence may not over-
whelming, and will be worth incurring when they are outweighed by the benefits of maintain-
ing convergence. There are two typical types of case when this is likely to be the case: First, 
when one legal system is young or small and as such lacking in sufficient case-law, which is 
the central building block for the common law tradition; and second, when another legal sys-
tem is considered superior in terms of its lawmakers’ (perceived) expertise. (Obviously, these 
two scenarios are often, although not always, related.) But as legal systems mature, the bene-
fits of convergence decline while the costs increase. Judges in the formerly ‘expert’ legal system 
will no longer seem necessarily superior to the local judiciary, especially when it comes to local 
conditions, in terms of both facts and values. And with a thicket of local legal materials in-
creasing, keeping up with the materials of another jurisdiction will become more onerous and 
seem less necessary. (Arguably, there is an optimal amount of cases to master and rationalize, 
beyond which any effort to articulate a more-or-less coherent single tradition from the cases 
becomes unwieldy and the tradition approach begins to break down. This may be one reason 





is an inevitable result of the fact that the common law exists in an environment increasingly 
more saturated with statute, and the common law must often be understood and interpreted 
in relation to that legislation. Since legislators are much less concerned about maintaining 
convergence, legislation is more likely to move in different directions in different countries, 
based on the local needs and political forces. This will push the common law in different ju-
risdictions in different directions, making maintaining common law convergence more diffi-
cult. Doing so may appear elitist when doing so is preferred over solutions that seem to fit the 
values of the particular community. Even from a more legal point of view, caring for common 
law convergence may look like an ‘academic’ self-indulgence compared with maintaining in-
ternal coherence within each legal system between its judge-made and statutory law.  
Another possible cost of maintaining convergence is that with growing maturity and ex-
pertise, the relationship between the two legal systems has to change from largely unidirec-
tional (where one legal system is primarily a law-maker and another is primarily a law-taker) 
to a reciprocal one. But lawyers in the formerly ‘superior’ legal system may not acquiesce to 
their new lower status. This creates a problem, since without them agreeing to that, lawyers of 
the formerly ‘receiving’ legal system will not see the situation as one of convergence, but ra-
ther as one in which they must accept and follow what is imposed from above (or outside). 
And this will be perceived as an additional, possibly prohibitively hefty, cost. (Could this be 
the reason why it is mostly English scholars who lament the decline of common law conver-
gence while those from, say, Australia or Canada seem much less concerned about going their 
own way?)  
For these reasons, even within the tradition view, common law convergence will tend to 
naturally decline with time unless it is vigilantly pursued. In fact, the tradition view may actu-
ally call for less convergence once two legal systems have begun charting their separate ways. 
Once two legal systems have begun taking two different paths, the tradition view with the 
premium it places on path dependence may call for keeping them to these paths rather than 
attempting a precipitous shift toward another approach just for the sake of getting closer to a 
solution adopted in another jurisdiction. As a result, the tradition view that in some cases 
supports convergence, beyond a certain point can actually encourage divergence.  
At a deeper level, there is, I think, a decline in the appeal of the tradition view itself. This 
is a crucial point, because maintaining convergence is valuable only if one accepts the tradition 
view of the authority of the common law. With different degrees of intensity, one finds the ques-
tion ‘Why should our common law be grounded on the tradition model of authority?’ being 
asked. Of course, the question is not rarely asked in quite this way, but in different formula-
tions, it is asked at increasing frequency. As mentioned earlier, the tradition view of the com-
mon law depends on a perception of law as an autonomous discipline, of law as the generator 
of normative requirements on the basis of careful elaboration of its own past materials, where 
expertise consists of mastering the contents of countless court decisions. Though not com-





One reason for that is that the tradition view is premised on the idea that the authority 
of the common law derives from judges’ ability to discover in legal materials certain values 
that run deep in a particular community. This view thus could avoid the puzzle of the author-
ity of the common law by assuming both that judges are experts and that their expertise is of 
value for determining the content of legal rules for a particular community. These days, both 
assumptions look suspect. The first assumption has been affected by the many detailed studies 
have suggested that the seemingly neutral, equal, common law has (perhaps completely in-
nocuously) shown greater concern for the interests of certain groups rather than others, un-
surprisingly the groups of those who belong to the elite that on the tradition view shape the 
common law. As a result, even someone sympathetic to tradition as a source of authority 
might not like the way the common law implements it. In response, the common has 
changed in various ways to address this problem, although the extent of its success is, of 
course, a controversial matter. The second concern is, I think, even more serious, as it touches 
on the nature of lawyers’, especially judges’, alleged expertise. For the tradition-based approach 
not only accepts but actually celebrates the common law’s separation from external standards. 
The common law expert is someone who does not know much about the way the law actually 
works in practice, and who has little ability to assess the potential effects of different rules. 
Even more simply, the common law expert has relatively little knowledge on the extent to 
which the common law adequately addresses actual concerns and needs of the population. It 
is, for example, notable that the idea that sexual harassment or stalking should be treated as a 
tort (a matter that in terms of numbers is potentially relevant to the lives of millions) did not 
originate from doctrinal tort scholars, but exactly from those who adopted an ‘external’ or 
critical perspective on the law. For what the common law considers expertise—great 
knowledge of a mass of cases and the ability to work them out to a more-or-less coherent ac-
count of ‘the law’—can hardly help with addressing developing needs of society. (Could it be 
that such considerations are judged as ‘external’ to the evaluation of the common law because 
they are external to what the common law experts know?) Instead, the tradition-based ap-
proach suggests that the decision how certain areas of life should be structured is ideally to be 
decided on nothing more than the primitive tools of the Talmudic scholar and the scholastic 
student: mastery of past pronouncements made by people who are equally ignorant of the 
law’s effects, and who focus their attention on the articulation of verbal formulae and ‘tests’ 
for identifying whether a new decision adequately follows past decisions or is properly ‘distin-
guishable’ from them. When stripped of its mysticism the tradition view can thus be seen as a 
little more than seventeenth-century policy analysis. 
It is this reality that has led to the narrowing down of the scope of decision-making giv-
en to this kind of expertise, as is evident from the decreasing significance of the common law. 
In areas still governed by the common law, there have been various attempts to attempts to 
change the common law in various ways that will give its decision-makers the tools to make 
better-informed decisions. This process further weakens the hold of the appeal to the norma-





sions based more on an assessment of the contemporary needs of their particular society, tak-
ing also into account local cultural, social, political circumstances. And these, needless to say, 
are not exactly to same across the common law world. 
To be sure, England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all democratic, developed 
countries; but then so are Denmark and Japan. There might have been a time in the past 
when, perhaps, one could speak of similarity in values between England and its former colo-
nies (although I suspect that even then this was more an elite concern than something that 
preoccupied the whole population), but with much immigration from non-English speaking 
countries and the slow development of more uniquely local ways, it makes little sense to 
maintain that Australian, Canadian, English (or is it British?), and New Zealand cultures are 
all the same. These differences, even if not huge, can (and do) have an effect on the outcomes 
of cases, especially contentious ones. Differences between common law countries are then 
seen not as a cause for concern, but as a sign of independence. 
Against all this, we can return to the questions posed in the beginning of this essay: Why 
do some lawyers consider it more important that the tort law of England and Australia or the 
contract law of Canada and New Zealand be similar than their constitutional law, their com-
pany law, or their labour law? Why, even though criminal law is (or used to be) part of the 
‘common law’, there are no concerned voices about the fact that the criminal laws of different 
common law countries may be different? I believe the way I set up the question helps identify 
the answer. As far as I can see, maintaining common law convergence is important for those 
who seek to maintain the tradition view of the common law itself (and along the way, validate 
their own kind of expertise). What better proof could there be for the idea that the common 
law is a matter of non-political expertise than the fact that politically independent states share 
the same common law? Common law convergence is thus valued for proponents of the tradi-
tion view both for demonstrating the truth of this view, and for perpetuating it.  
Common law convergence, however, is a rather weak reed for maintaining a view that is 
independently unattractive. As we have seen, the common law convergence view is deeply 
connected to the idea of law as an autonomous discipline, and this is a view held these days by 
a shrinking minority. We know too much about the world to think that the path to improv-
ing the law exclusively, or even primarily, depends on analysing judges’ pronouncements. As a 
result, the decline in commonality is both indicative of, and accelerates, the decline of the 
theory of authority that values common law convergence and the autonomy of law, a process 
which in turn weakens the hold of convergence even further.  
V. Concluding Remarks 
The last section should not be misunderstood. My claim is not that common lawyers should 
not consider what happens in other countries; and if they do, it is more likely that they will 
do so with courts from the rest of the English-speaking world. That is why what I said in this 





longer be able to understand each other’s judgments. If nothing else, there is no language bar-
rier to overcome, and other non-legal links may keep common law jurisdictions somewhat 
closer to each other than others. And in law, perhaps more than elsewhere, old habits die 
hard. It is notable, however, that common lawyers care much less than they used to whether 
their own legal system adopts the same solutions as other common law countries,56 and my 
claim is that this trend will continue and probably intensify. My prediction is thus that most 
Commonwealth lawyers will care about Commonwealth convergence the same way they feel 
about maintaining convergence with American law, which means, not much. 
More generally, this essay was motivated by an underlying normative claim. It is im-
portant to note that those who would like to maintain convergence in the common law are 
really making a very narrow claim in two senses. They intend common law convergence to be 
limited to a small list of legal areas, namely contract, tort, and restitution (even property law, 
let alone criminal law or family, no longer look like obvious candidates for convergence); and 
they intend it to a small subsection of common law countries, namely England, Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand. This convergence is presented as required by nothing more than the 
fact of a shared history (recall Stevens’s words: ‘as common lawyers we are part of the same 
family whether we like it or not’) and it delivers precisely the kind of convergence that fits the 
tradition view of common law authority and its supposedly non-political nature. What I have 
sought to show is that this call for convergence is not free from politics. Indeed, Stevens him-
self has alluded to a more positive reason for maintaining common law convergence when he 
said that ‘[t]he shape and nature of the common law has been determined by its method of 
creation. Civil codes are the products of the choices of legislators, under the influence of legal 
scholars, and it is unsurprising that the choice made differ in many respects from those of 
judges, whose role and concerns are not the same.”57 This is partly true, but Stevens’s mistake, 
like that of many other proponents of the tradition view, is to think that once a legal system 
belongs to the common law, it must be understood and justified in terms of the tradition view 
of authority. As I have attempted to show, this is not the case, and if the common law does 
not interact with politics anywhere else, its underlying theory of authority is not politically 
neutral, but one that has real-world, practical, implications.  
The concluding section has made what may be understood as another prediction (or 
perhaps just a bit of wishful thinking), and that is that the decline in convergence is part of a 
decline of the tradition view itself, and that its decline may bring with it not just the dissolu-
tion of the idea of a common law world, but also the decline of the idea of the common law as 
a decision procedure. If this is to happen, we will witness a decline in the view that mere mas-
tery of past court decisions, together with some facility with language and informal logic, are 
a good basis for adequately-regulating any aspect of human behavior. In medieval times this 
was the method used because this was the only method available; this is no longer the case.  
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That is why, even though the common law is still with us, it is far less important than it 
used to be. Its marginalization is proof of the mistrust in this method of regulation and its 
experts. Even where the common law governs a question, it is rarely left to its own devices and 
is virtually everywhere accompanied by extensive legislative regulation. With regard to those 
decisions still given to judges, there is growing awareness on part of the judges that they 
should base their decisions on the scope of the legal rules they adopt on better information on 
the social effects of their choices. Many proponents of the common law method resist this 
move making the point that judges do not have the necessary knowledge or ability to assess 
questions of social policy. But since such considerations are clearly relevant for deciding such 
questions, if it is indeed the case that judges cannot evaluate them, the sensible solution is not 
to remove the considerations for the decision-making process, but to remove the judges from it. 
The prevalence of regulation is proof that this is in fact the solution that has been adopted in 
countless of contexts. One implication of the argument in this essay is that this process cannot 
be separated from the decline in common law convergence.  
  
